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ccording to Australia’s Reserve Bank Act, the central bank’s broad
policy objectives include maintaining the stability of the currency,
full employment, and the economic prosperity and welfare of the
people of Australia. In 1993 the Reserve Bank of Australia adopted a spe-
cific, and thus transparent, inflation target as its operating objective; it
aims to keep overall inflation1 between 2 percent and 3 percent on average
over the business cycle. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is accountable directly to the
Parliament and, through Parliament, to the general public. The Reserve
Bank Act (1959) requires the Bank’s Board to provide an annual report on
its operations and finances to the Treasurer and to Parliament. A 1996
“Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” issued jointly by the
Governor of the Bank and the Treasurer, clarifies the respective roles of
the Bank and the government in regard to monetary policy and provides
formal government endorsement of the Bank’s inflation objective. It also
outlines a procedure for the Governor to appear before the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Financial Insti-
tutions, and Public Administration twice a year to report on its conduct of
monetary policy. In the event of a disagreement between the Government
and the Bank’s Board on policy issues, the Reserve Bank Act lays out the
procedures to be followed. They have never been used, and formal and
informal contacts between the Bank, the Treasury, and other government
departments are frequent.14 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
Central Bank Assets
At the end of June 2001, the Reserve Bank of
Australia held assets equaling $A58 billion, of which
62 percent were in foreign exchange and 2 percent
in gold. Government securities (of which the major-
ity were securities sold under repurchase agree-
ments) comprised 8 percent, while loans, advances
and bills held (including securities bought under
repurchase agreements), and clearing items made
up 26 percent.
Since the Bank began announcing its policy
changes in 1990, the desired stance of monetary policy
has been expressed in terms of the operating target for
the cash rate, the money market rate on overnight
interbank funds. Because the Australian system oper-
ates without reserve requirements, the banks’ demand
for overnight funds stems from their need for settle-
ment balances, which are held as exchange settlement
(ES) accounts at the Reserve Bank. Each bank is
required to have a positive balance in its ES account at
all times. Through its daily open market operations,
the Reserve Bank adjusts the supply of funds to keep
the cash rate close to its target.
Open Market Operations 
Although, with minor exceptions, only banks
have ES accounts, the Reserve Bank of Australia is
now willing to deal with all major financial institu-
tions, both bank and nonbank, that are members of
the Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System
(RITS), an electronic system for the settlement of
large-value cash and Commonwealth Government
Securities (CGS) transactions.2 Currently, RITS has
137 members—54 banks, 3 special service
providers, and 80 nonbanks—but in practice the
Bank deals regularly with around a dozen institu-
tions. The Bank conducts two types of transactions.
It may buy (sell) outright CGSs of less than about
eighteen months to maturity. It also accepts CGS,
state and territory Commonwealth government,
and certain supranational securities in repurchase
agreements. In fact, 80 percent of open market
transactions take the form of repos. The average
maturity of the repo book has lengthened in recent
years from two days in the mid-1990s to 12 days in
2000–01. In addition—and to an increasing extent—
the Reserve Bank may choose to do a foreign
exchange swap (basically a repo, with both a spot
delivery and an agreement for future reversal,
based on foreign exchange rather than securities)
for purposes relating to liquidity management
rather than to exchange rate stabilization.
When Australia moved from a deferred, net settle-
ment system to real time gross settlement (RTGS) in
June 1998, the schedule for open market operations
changed slightly. The Reserve Bank still announces its
estimate of the banking system’s cash position for the
day and its dealing intentions at 9:30 a.m. Bids/offers
are then tendered and accepted in order of attractive-
ness, based on term and yield, up to the volume need-
ed to keep the cash rate at the target level. The process
is usually complete by 10:15 a.m. Since the switch to
RTGS, the Bank also stands ready to conduct open
market operations at a second time later in the day if
needed. In practice, the Bank has conducted a second
round of open market operations very infrequently,
just a few times per year. 
Standing Facilities
Under real time gross settlement, the banks face a
continuous flow of payments and receipts through
their exchange settlement accounts all day. To reduce
the risk of an unexpected loss of liquidity or an
episode of gridlock if a bank is unable to make a pay-
ment, the Reserve Bank of Australia has established
two facilities to be activated at the discretion of the
banks.3 The first is an intraday, collateralized repo
facility that allows banks to raise interest-free cash
from the Reserve Bank at any time during the day as
long as the transaction is reversed before the close of
business. The second facility is an end-of-day standby.
This facility allows a bank that is unable to borrow
from the money market late in the day to do an
overnight repo with the Reserve Bank, exchanging
securities acceptable for open market operations for
cash at an interest rate 25 basis points above the target
1 Originally, the target referred to underlying inflation, but
after the Australian Bureau of Statistics removed distortions related
to mortgage and consumer interest rates from its measure of infla-
tion, the RBAswitched to the overall index.
2 For over 30 years, until 1996, the Reserve Bank carried out
open market operations through authorized money market dealers.
Banks held their settlement balances as interest-paying loans to the
dealers, and ES balances at the Reserve Bank, which paid no interest,
were very low. In 1996, the Bank began dealing with all major finan-
cial institutions. It also began paying interest on ES balances. At first,
it paid 10 basis points below the target cash rate, an excessively
attractive rate that caused ES accounts to rise sharply. Since October
1997, ES balances have earned a rate 25 basis points below the target
cash rate, and these balances have fallen to more desirable levels.
3 Use of these facilities has no quantitative limit beyond the
need for adequate collateral.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 15
cash rate—again at the discretion of the bank.4 Fearing
that such recourse would be seen as a sign of weak-
ness, the banks originally proved reluctant to use it.
However, once the Reserve Bank clarified its view that
occasional use should be considered a normal part of
the RTGS framework, drawings picked up a bit.
Nonetheless, in 2000–01 only 18 draws were made on
this facility. 
Possible Future Changes in the 
Settlements Systems
The transition to RTGS was very smooth. Al-
though the demand for ES balances rose with the
introduction of RTGS, once the participants got used
to the new system, they found it allowed them to econ-
omize on such balances. Throughout the transition,
the cash rate remained stable, with little change in its
daily volatility from the average of recent years.
Looking ahead, the Reserve Bank of Australia is
exploring ways to assess the safety and efficiency of its
payments system and to establish criteria for approv-
ing netting systems, which would likely reduce liquid-
ity costs even further. In addition, because Australia
has five separate clearing and settlement systems—
one each for Commonwealth government debt, other
debt, equities, options, and futures—the possibilities
of consolidating positions versus a single central coun-
terparty for certain debt securities or of allowing some
rationalization of the systems is also under discussion.
Such moves, which are under way in parts of Europe
and Canada, might possibly further reduce the de-
mand for ES balances. On the other hand, these bal-
ances are already so low (on average less than $A1 
billion) that banks may not be willing to reduce them
any further.5
Changes in Eligible Collateral as a Response
to the Diminished Supply of Commonwealth
Government Securities
According to OECD data, after the general govern-
ment financial deficit peaked at 6 percent of nominal
GDP in 1992, Australia achieved a surplus of 0.5 per-
cent in 1998. This surplus is likely to reach about 1 per-
cent of GDP in 2005, according to OECD projections.
Australia’s gross financial liabilities are expected to 
fall to 27 percent of GDPby 2001, down from 42 percent
in 1995, while net financial liabilities are projected 
to dwindle to 7 percent of GDP from 27 percent in 
1995. Recently, the Australian Treasury announced a
Commonwealth government surplus of $A2.3 billion
in 2000–01. As the Commonwealth’s budget has moved
into surplus, the net stock of CGS on issue has fallen
from $A107 billion in 1997 to $A66 billion in 2001 (10
percent of GDP).6 With large negative funding require-
ments in recent years, the Commonwealth’s modest
new issuance programs were undertaken primarily to
maintain the liquidity and efficiency of CGS markets.
In particular, the Treasury has sought to build liquidity
in its key benchmark instrument, the Fixed Coupon
Bond, over a yield curve extending to 12 to 13 years.
In anticipation of these trends, in June 1997 the
Reserve Bank expanded the list of securities that it
could accept as collateral for repos to include
Australian dollar securities issued by the central bor-
rowing authorities of the state and territory govern-
ments (semi-government securities), as long as they
were lodged in the main trading system for these
securities, Austraclear. Expectation and the announce-
ment that the Bank would expand its list of eligible
collateral to include semi-government debt coincided
with a sharp fall in the spread between rates on semi-
government securities and CGSs. Since then, spreads
have returned to their average of the early 1990s. In
1997–98, about 30 percent of the Bank’s repos were
based on securities issued by state and territory gov-
ernments. In June 2001, state government securities
represented 42 percent of the collateral used in
Reserve Bank operations. This ratio is broadly in line
with the share of these securities in total government
securities outstanding. At other times, however, the
semi-governments have represented a disproportion-
ately large share of the repo book, in part because the
opportunity cost of using state government securities
is less than that for CGSs. In addition, in June 1997,
the Prime Assets Requirement (PAR) was reduced
from 6 percent of banks’ liabilities to 3 percent, and
state government securities became eligible as PAR
assets. These changes allowed the banks to reduce
their holdings of CGSs, increasing the supply of
securities for open market transactions. In April
1998, the Reserve Bank also announced that the PAR
4 The Reserve Bank applies a haircut to the collateral accepted
at its end-of-day facility but not at its intraday facility. It also makes
a haircut of 2 percent of cash value for repos used in open market
operations. It marks all assets to market daily and makes margin
calls if its exposure exceeds 1 percent of the funds extended.
5 The Reserve Bank suggests that an enduring shortage of CGS
may also encourage the banks to hold more ES balances for liquidity
reasons.
6 Net of holdings of the Loan Consolidation and Investment
Reserve as of June 30, 2001. 16 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
would be abolished once the banks have persuaded
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority of the
adequacy of their liquidity management policies.7
Most recently, in October 2000 and June 2001, the
Bank further widened its range of eligible securities to
include certain highly rated supranational paper and
Australian dollar-denominated securities issued by
state and territory governments in euro markets and
lodged in Austraclear as “euroentitlements.”
Nevertheless, on occasion, the Reserve Bank has
also felt the need to supplement its open market trans-
actions in domestic securities with foreign exchange
swaps (or repos). So far, these transactions have been
small relative to those in government securities
(turnover of $A90 billion in foreign exchange swaps
versus $A393 billion in government securities in
2000–01). However, despite the government’s pledge to
sustain a degree of liquidity in the Commonwealth
bond market, the Bank has suggested that use of foreign
exchange swaps may become a more routine part of its
open market operations as the supply of government
securities shrinks. Its motivation would be to leave
CGSs in private hands to promote market liquidity.
The need to maintain the value of the Reserve
Bank of Australia’s capital is a critical element in deter-
mining its choice of assets to be used in open market
operations and accepted as collateral at its standing
facilities.8 The absolute creditworthiness of the
Commonwealth and accepted supranationals and the
high credit standing of the states explain the use of
their debt. Because the Bank conducts whatever trans-
actions are necessary to implement monetary policy, it
accepts the consequent domestic market risk as a
residual. However, the Bank is comfortable that the
duration of the domestic portfolio has tended to
decline with increased use of repos. The concern about
maintaining the value of the Bank’s capital also
explains why the Bank prefers to use foreign exchange
swaps (in effect, investing in absolutely creditworthy
and highly liquid U.S. Treasuries) when the scope for
using very creditworthy domestic securities is con-
strained. The Bank sees the market for U.S. Treasury
securities as underpinning the global credit curve, but
if U.S. Treasury securities were to become much less
widely available in future, the Bank would have to
find an alternative. Any difficulty in trading U.S.
Treasury paper would raise concerns about credit risk. 
All in all, declining CGS issuance is a serious mat-
ter for the Reserve Bank of Australia. While the current
level of issuance is not generally an impediment to
normal market operations, from time to time problems
become evident. Moreover, in the face of current gov-
ernment surpluses, the Bank’s repo book has on occa-
sion expanded to the point where the Bank faces poten-
tial constraints in conducting normal open market
operations because it cannot find counterparties with
enough securities to offer. From time to time, the
spread between unsecured and secured lending has
widened as stock becomes scarcer. Accordingly, an
Australian consensus is emerging that preserving the
transparency and liquidity of the CGS market has
merit. The Australian Office of Financial Management
has indicated that it intends to maintain the liquidity
of the CGS market. It is currently formulating a longer-
term strategy that will broadly entail maintaining
Australia’s current gross level of debt, while acquiring
still-to-be-specified “assets.”
Loans of Bonds
The Reserve Bank of Australia serves as agent for
the Commonwealth in certain debt management activ-
ities, for example, conducting tenders, secondary mar-
ket purchases, and the like.9 The Bank also undertakes
transactions on its own account to enhance the liquidi-
ty of the bond market. To this end, the Bank stands
ready to lend from its own portfolio of domestic bonds
(at a penalty rate).10 These transactions, which
involved bonds valued at around $A1 billion in 2000–
01, do not affect the liquidity of the banking system,
because one type of security is swapped for another,
and no cash changes hands. The Bank believes that
were the supply of CGSs on issue to decline signifi-
cantly, stock shortages might become more frequent,
and the Bank’s stock lending facility could become
more important. 
Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange
Reserve Management
Although Australia allows its dollar to float to
cushion the impact of external shocks, from time to
time the Reserve Bank intervenes in the foreign
7 The banks will still be required to hold liquid assets, as nego-
tiated with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
8 Accordingly, the Bank requires that all of its assets, including
its repos, be marked to market daily, and any changes in the value of
its assets are recorded in a valuation account. If necessary, margins
will be adjusted if the RBA’s net exposure exceeds 1 percent of the
unwind value.
9 Debt management policy resides with the Australian Office
of Financial Management. 
10 The Bank prices its stock at a penalty to the market rate to
encourage the view that it is the “lender of last resort.”Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 17
exchange markets on its own behalf to moderate
movements that seem excessive relative to economic
fundamentals. Although most of its intervention
occurs in spot markets, the Bank makes occasional use
of options on the Australian dollar. This allows the
Bank to use a limited outlay to create a significant
demand for Australian dollars on the part of dealers
who had sold the options and need to hedge. The Bank
manages its foreign exchange reserves with an eye to
liquidity, risk, and return. The Bank holds the bulk of
its foreign exchange reserves in securities issued by
the national governments of the United States,
Germany, and Japan and in deposits with highly rated
banks. The benchmark duration of assets in these port-
folios is 30 months. In recent years, with yields on
Japanese bonds unusually low and the risk of capital
losses unusually high, the Bank reduced the maturity
of its Japanese assets and the share of these assets in its
foreign currency portfolio. This underweight position
was unwound last year so that the portfolio is now
close to its benchmark target. More generally, the
Reserve Bank now adopts a more passive approach to
the management of its foreign exchange reserves than
was the case until a year or two ago.
So far, the decline in issuance of U.S. Treasuries
has had a negligible impact on the way the Reserve
Bank of Australia manages its reserves, but any seri-
ous diminution of the market for U.S. Treasuries
would likely force the Bank to hold a much smaller
share of its official reserve assets in the United States.
In any event, with the entry of 11 European govern-
ments into the European Monetary Union, the Bank is
considering expanding its holdings into other highly
rated, liquid bonds.
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